Founded in 1927, Temple Law Review is a student-edited, quarterly journal dedicated to providing a forum for the expression of new legal thought and scholarly commentary on important developments, trends, and issues in the law.
Taxpayers with limited English proficiency (LEP) face inherent barriers to exercising important rights under the tax laws. This Essay, prepared for the Temple Law Review‘s Symposium, Taxpayer Rights in the United States: All the Angles, explains the legal obligations that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has for making the tax system accessible to LEP taxpayers. While the IRS has developed […]
How can Congress’s codification of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR) make a meaningful difference in tax administration? This question will likely confront academics, policymakers, and judges in the coming years. In late 2015, Congress codified the rights that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administratively adopted in 2014, explicitly requiring that the Commissioner ensure that IRS employees receive training and […]
This Essay examines the 2018 federal district court ruling in Facebook, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service to make three arguments regarding the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR), codified as Section 7803(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The first is that the TBOR is enforceable, despite the lack of explicit statutory remedies, via an implied private right of action. The […]
What is the modern role of a tax practitioner, in particular a tax attorney, in the United States? In an era in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is underfunded, understaffed, and struggles to address its mission, tax attorneys play an important role as advocates for taxpayer rights. Tax attorneys act as advocates who represent ordinary individual taxpayers […]
A victim’s published letter not only indicts her rapist but also the fraternity culture that enabled such victimization. Exposés of a film executive not only reveal a serial predator but also a corporate culture that turned a blind eye to his violence. The reporting, in turn, brings accountability to groups—police departments, film companies, fraternities—that the law has long been unable, or unwilling, to reform.
The alien torture plaintiff faces a litany of barriers to entry to U.S. courts. These barriers include the state secrets privilege, the Alien Tort Statute’s (ATS) territoriality and well-established cause of action requirements, and immunities of all sorts. Even once a torture plaintiff’s foot is in the courthouse door, he faces the difficult task of establishing that the conduct at issue meets the torture standard and that the defendant is legally responsible for the conduct. This Comment, however, will focus on just one of the obstacles faced by the torture plaintiff: the political question doctrine (PQD).
Although the Supreme Court provided guidance on when a court should entertain a crime-fraud exception claim in United States v. Zolin, that case did not specify how much or what kind of proof is necessary, or how much evidence of intent by the client is required, for a court to invoke the exception and overcome the application of the privilege. State courts and the lower federal courts have since been left to grapple with this important issue on a case-by-case basis and have reached differing conclusions. This Article examines the law that has developed in this area since the Supreme Court decided Zolin and argues that setting too high a bar for application of the crime-fraud exception is inconsistent with the policy grounds that underlie the attorney-client privilege and can have serious adverse consequences for the administration of justice.
Scholars have long critiqued the principles that animate what I have termed the equal protection right to compete. Less attention, however, has been paid to whether existing doctrine actually promotes this vision of equality. One might presume that it does. Yet empirical findings spanning employment, law enforcement, and education suggest the opposite. Specifically, scholarship from the mind sciences reveals that common facially neutral evaluative tools—such as human judgment, standardized tests, and predictive algorithms—can systematically mismeasure an individual’s existing talent and potential (that is, merit) because of her race. Accordingly, when decisionmakers rely on such “racial mismeasures” to determine whom to hire or admit, they effectively compromise each candidate’s right to an individualized, meritocratic, and race-free review.
Despite congressional findings that all people are “presumed to be capable of engaging in gainful employment,” individuals with serious intellectual disabilities face barriers to obtaining and maintaining meaningful employment. One barrier to employment is the lack of funding for long-term job support, which many individuals with intellectual disabilities require. Although the primary method of funding long-term support is Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services Waivers, states limit the number of waivers available to their residents and leave many people on waiting lists for funding. Unfortunately, states are not required to provide a waiver to every eligible individual, as the Medicaid statute does not require that states give funding for community-based services to all. This lack of entitlement to a waiver results in an administrative failure and denial of equal employment opportunities for individuals with intellectual disabilities.
This Comment analyzes the firm resettlement bar—a statutory bar that denies asylum if the applicant received an offer of some type of permanent resettlement status in a third country that is not the United States or the applicant’s country of origin—by exploring its history and jurisprudence. This Comment argues that to lessen the risk of denial of meritorious asylum and refugee claims, the list of exceptions to the firm resettlement bar must be expanded to encompass situations where (1) citizens of the third country—not just the third country’s government—placed restrictive conditions on the asylum applicant, (2) fraudulent documents were used to gain entry into the third country, (3) the applicant has temporarily traveled from the third country back to the country of origin for good reason, or (4) the third country becomes dangerous after a formal offer of firm resettlement has been made.